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Abstract
We use data on wages and rents in diﬀerent U.S. cities to assess the
amenity eﬀects on production and consumption of cultural diversity as
measured by diversity of countries of birth of city residents. We show
that US-born citizens living in metropolitan areas where the share of
foreign-born increased between 1970 and 1990 have experienced a sig-
niﬁcant average increase in their wage and in the rental price of their
housing. Such ﬁnding is economically signiﬁcant and robust to omitted
variable bias and endogeneity bias. We then present a model in which
cultural diversity may have both production and consumption amenity
or disamenity eﬀects. As people and ﬁrms are mobile across cities in the
long run, the model implies that the joint results from the wage and rent
regressions are consistent with a dominant production amenity eﬀect of
cultural diversity.
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11 Introduction
In recent years there has been a resurgence of international migration directed
to industrialized countries. As a consequence, the share of foreign-born resi-
dents has increased dramatically in the population of traditionally ‘receiving
countries’, such as the United States, as well as of several European countries
(most notably, France, Germany, and the UK; more recently, Italy, Spain, and
Austria). Rising immigrant pressures in industrialized countries have generated
an intense policy debate on the opportunity of imposing additional restrictions
on legal and illegal migration ﬂows.
The debate has been accompanied by a large empirical literature on the
consequences of migration (see, e.g. Borjas, 1994, 1995; Boeri, Hanson and Mc-
Cormick, 2002, Card 1990, 2001). Such literature has mostly focused on the
short-run distributional consequences of migration in terms of lower wages and
higher unemployment for unskilled natives, and on the rising costs of social se-
curity resulting from the inﬂow of relatively unskilled labor. A similar emphasis
also characterizes the discussion on the long-run consequences of immigration
that has been mainly framed within the neoclassical growth model (see, e.g.,
Dolado et al., 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Canova and Ravn, 2000).
From such perspective, international immigration is assimilated to an increase
in the rate of growth of the unskilled labour force resulting in a dilution of phys-
ical and human capital in the receiving countries. Migration has been studied as
a mechanism that fosters convergence in income per capita and wages between
capital-abundant receiving countries and capital-scarce sending ones.
Our work takes a diﬀerent angle in looking at this issue. Rather than study-
ing the short-run eﬀects of new immigration on the receiving country in a classic
model of skill supply and demand, we consider a multi-city model of production
and consumption and we ask what is the value of the cultural diversity that
foreign-born bring to each city. If cultural diversity is a city characteristic (cer-
tainly endogenous) we can learn about its value from the long-run equilibrium
distribution of wages and prices across cities.
Diversity over several dimensions has been praised by economists as valuable
in consumption and production. Jacobs (1969) attributes the success of cities
to their industrial diversity. Glaeser et al. (2001) identify in the diversity
of available consumption goods one of the attractive features of cities. More
generally, Fujita et al (1999) use ‘love of variety’ in preferences and technology
as the building block of their theory of spatial development.
We believe that cultural diversity may very well be an important aspect of
diversity with consequences on production as well as consumption. The aim of
this paper is to quantify the value of cultural diversity, as measured by the pres-
ence of foreign-born in a city, to US-born people. “It’s hard to put a number on
buzz but there must be some value” (Richard Freeman, cited by The Economist,
2002). Who can deny that Italian restaurants, French beauty shops, German
breweries, Belgian chocolate stores, Russian ballets, Indian tea houses and Thai
massages constitute valuable consumption amenities inaccessible to Americans
were not for their foreign-born residents? Similarly the skills and abilities of
2foreign-born workers and thinkers may complement those of native workers and
thus boost problem solving and eﬃciency on the workplace.1 Cultural diversity
would act as a production amenity in this case. On the other hand, natives may
not like to live in a multicultural environment in so far as this may endanger
their own cultural values or intercultural frictions may reduce their productivity.
Cultural diversity would, then, act as a consumption or production disamenity
respectively.
We focus on cities in the US as a natural laboratory, the reason being that
cultural diversity has long been one of the hallmarks of US society. For this
reason, our analysis on US cities serves as a benchmark for studies on other
developed countries in Europe and Asia that are becoming increasingly diverse
due to recent inﬂows of foreign workers. As US-born people are highly mobile
across US cities, following Roback (1982) we develop a model of a multicultural
system of open cities that allows us to use the observed variations of wages and
rents of US-born workers to identify the nature of the externalities associated
with cultural diversity. Our main ﬁnding is that, on average, US-born citizens
attribute a dominant production amenity value to cultural diversity. We believe
that this result is interesting, robust and new in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on the economic consequences of cultural diversity. Section 3 introduces our
dataset of 160 US metropolitan areas during the period 1970-1990 and surveys
the main stylized facts: cultural diversity in a city is signiﬁcantly positively
correlated with the average wage and rent of US-born citizens in that city.
Section 4 develops the theoretical model that is used to design our estimation
strategy in terms of joint wage and rent equations. Section 5 runs the regressions
and checks the results for robustness and endogeneity. Section 6 discusses the
results and concludes.
2L i t e r a t u r e o n D i v e r s i t y
Cultural diversity and its eﬀects, often deﬁn e di ns p e c i ﬁc ways, have attracted
the attention of many applied economists for a long time. The applied ‘labor’ lit-
erature has analyzed ethnic diversity and ethnic ‘segregation’ in the U.S. as well
as its impact on economic discrimination and the achievements of minorities.
The focus of attention has often been the black-white gap. Few examples among
many contributions are Card and Krueger (1992), (1993), Cutler and Glaeser
(1997), Arrow (1998), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Mason (2000). While the
black-white issue can be reduced to diﬀerent ‘countries of origin’ going far back
in the past, this paper does not focus on this aspect of cultural diversity. We
control for black-white composition issues but we never focus on them.
1The anedoctical evidence of the contribution of foreign born to ‘big thinking’ in the US is
quite rich. One striking example is the following. In the last ten years, out of the 47 US-based
Nobel laureates in Chemistry, Physics and Medicine, 25 per cent (14 laureates) were not US-
born. During the same time period the share of foreign-born in the general population was on
average only 13 per cent. From our perspective, such example is interesting because research
in hard sciences is typically based on large team work.
3Much more closely related to our analysis is the literature on the impact of
immigration on the US labor market. Several contributions by George Borjas
(1994), (1995), and (1999) focus on the issue of new immigrants into the US
and their eﬀect on native workers. Similarly important contributions by David
Card (notably, Card, 1990; Card and Di Nardo, 2000; Card, 2001) analyze the
reactions of domestic workers and their wages to inﬂows of new immigrants.
These contributions do not seem to achieve a consensus view either on the ef-
fect of new immigrants on wages of low skilled domestic workers (which seems,
however, small) or on the eﬀect of new immigrants on the migration behavior of
domestic workers. More recently, quite convincing evidence of a positive eﬀect
of immigrant inﬂows on rents in cities has been provided by Saiz (2003a,b). All
these studies share some common features especially in terms of their method-
ological approach. They all focus on the impact of new immigrants on wages
(rents) and domestic migration in the short run (within years) and use a classic
frame of labor demand-supply to analyze the eﬀects. They assume that im-
migrant and domestic workers, within a skill group, are homogeneous so that
immigration is a shift in labor supply, which aﬀects local wages (rents) more
or less depending on the mobility of domestic workers. Our approach takes a
rather diﬀerent stand. We consider that being ‘foreign-born’ is a feature that
permanently diﬀerentiates individuals (either new or old immigrants) in terms
of their non-market attributes and such feature may have consumption and
production amenity (or disamenity) value for US-born workers. Moreover, we
consider long-run variations of wages and rents relying on the assumption of
perfect mobility of US-born workers and ﬁrms across cities in the long run.
Fewer contributions have focused on other aspects of diversity (cultural and
linguistic) or looked at its relationships with productivity and welfare of US-born
people. Most of the studies focus on the downside of diversity in terms of its
static costs associated with lack of communication and transaction barriers. For
example, Lazear (1995) assumes that a common culture and a common language
facilitate exchange and trade between individuals. He argues that minorities
have incentives to become assimilated and to learn the language of the majority
in order to participate into a larger pool of potential trading partners. In his
model, as individuals do not properly internalize the social value of assimilation,
multiculturalism is bad. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) look at the relation
between the heterogeneity of preferences and the provision of public goods in
US cities. They show that the share of spending on productive public goods
is inversely related to the ethnic fragmentation of cities even after controlling
for other socioeconomic and demographic determinants. Here again cultural
diversity is bad.
Interestingly, and related to our work, several researchers in social sciences
have related diversity with urban agglomerations. The functioning and thriving
of urban clusters seem to rely on the eﬀective interaction of many units which
are ‘diverse’ in many respects. A ﬁrst example is given by urban studies. Jacobs
(1969) sees economic diversity as the key factor of a city’s success. Sassen (1994)
studies ‘global cities’ - such as London, Paris, New York, and Tokyo - and their
strategic role in the development of activities that are central to world economic
4growth and innovation, such as ﬁnance and specialized services. A key feature
of these cities is the cultural diversity of their populations. Similarly, Bairoch
(1998) sees cities and their diversity as the engine of economic growth. Such
diversity, however, has been mainly investigated in terms of diversiﬁed provision
of consumers’ goods and services as well as productive inputs (see, e.g., Quigley,
1998; Glaeser et al., 2001). In his work at the interface between sociology
and economics, Richard Florida (2003) argues that ‘diverse’ and tolerant cities,
populated by artists, bohemians, and other creative people are also the most
innovative cities in terms of high tech sectors. Our analysis of the role of cultural
diversity is an extension of these lines of research.
Another literature is also potentially relevant to our work in that it mo-
tivates the positive ‘production value’ of diversity. It consists of studies on
the organization and the management of teams. A standard assumption is
that diversity leads to more innovation and creativity because diversity implies
diﬀerent ways of framing problems, a richer set of alternative solutions, and
therefore higher quality decisions. Lazear (1999) provides an attempt to model
team interactions. He deﬁnes the ‘global ﬁrm’ as a team whose members come
from diﬀerent cultures or countries. Combining workers who have diﬀerent cul-
tures, legal systems, and languages imposes costs on the ﬁrm that would not
be present if all the workers were similar. However, complementarity between
workers, in terms of disjoint and relevant skills, oﬀsets the costs of cross-cultural
interaction.2 Here, again, multiculturalism is good.
Finally, there is a strand of studies in political economics that looks at
the historical eﬀects of cultural and ethnic diversity on the formation and the
behavior of institutions. Across countries, the extent of government corruption,
bureaucratic red tape, and black market activities as well as the protection of
property rights seem to be all aﬀected by the degree of ethnical fragmentation.
The traditional wisdom (conﬁrmed by Easterly and Levine, 1997) used to be that
more fragmented (i.e. diverse) societies promote more conﬂict and predatory
behavior, and generate less growth. However, recent studies have questioned
that logic by showing that higher ethnic diversity is not harmful to economic
development (see, e.g., Liam and Oneal, 1997). Collier (2001) actually ﬁnds
that, as long as their institutions are democratic, fractionalized societies have
better economic performance in their private sector than more homogenous
ones. In our work we take institutions as given and equal across US cities and
we only look at the eﬀect of diversity on production and consumption within
such institutional framework. It is interesting to notice, however, that also
from a historical perspective the issue of how diversity aﬀects productivity and
development is still somewhat controversial.
2Fujita and Berliant (2003) model ‘assimilation’as a result of team work: the very process
of cooperative knowledge creation reduces the heterogeneity of team members through the ac-
cumulation of knowledge in common. Under this respect, a perpetual reallocation of members
across diﬀerent teams may be necessary to keep creativity alive.
53 Cultural Diversity, Wages and Rents
This paper takes a very US-based approach to the issue of cultural diversity.
The question we are interested in is: What is there in cultural diversity for the
US-born people ? Do they beneﬁt at all from the presence of foreign-born? Do
they value it? If they do, how do we measure such beneﬁts?
Our analysis extracts the answers to those questions from the equilibrium
outcome deriving from the implicit evaluation of diversity that the US-born
make by ‘voting with their feet’. The underlying assumption is that US-born
workers and US ﬁrms are very mobile across cities in the long run. This assump-
tion is motivated by extensive empirical evidence that shows very large gross
migration ﬂows across states and cities. For instance, using census data, we
calculate that 36% of the population moved from one state to another between
1985 and 1990. As people respond to changes in the local working and living
environment of cities, the wage and rent variations that we observe in the long
run should reﬂect a spatial equilibrium: workers and ﬁrms are indiﬀerent among
alternative locations because they have eliminated any systematic diﬀerence in
indirect utility and proﬁts through migration.3 While postponing the formal-
ization of these ideas to Section 4, here we introduce our measure of cultural
diversity and present some suggestive stylized facts about its relationship with
average wages and rents in US cities.
3.1 Data and Diversity Index
Data at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level for the United States
a r ea v a i l a b l ef r o md i ﬀerent sources. We use mostly the Census Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS) for year 1971 and 1991 in order to calculate wages
and rents for speciﬁc groups of citizens in each MSA. We use the 1/100 sample
from the 15% PUMS of 1970 and the 5% PUMS for 1990. We also use data from
the ‘County and City Data Book’ from several years in order to obtain some
aggregate variables such as employment, income, population, spending for local
public goods. We consider 160 Standard MSAs (SMSAs) that are identiﬁed
in each of the census years considered. We have around 1,200,000 individual
observations for 1990, and 500,000 for 1970. We use them to construct aggregate
variables and indices at the SMSA level. The reason for focusing on SMSAs is
twofold. First, SMSAs constitute closely connected economic units within which
interactions are intense. Thus, they seem to ﬁt our theoretical model in which
commuting takes place within cities but not between cities. Second, they exhibit
a higher degree of diversity than the rest of the country as new immigrants and
their oﬀsprings traditionally settle down in larger cities.
W em e a s u r et h ea v e r a g ew a g eo fn a t i v ew o r k e r si na nM S Au s i n gt h ey e a r l y
wage of white US-born male residents between 40 and 50 years of age. The
average yearly wage constructed using this procedure for city c in year t,c a l li t
wct with c =1 ,...,160, is neither aﬀected by composition eﬀects nor distorted by
3We are grateful to Ed Glaeser for drawing our attention to the potential dividends of this
approach.
6potential discrimination factors (across genders or ethnicity) and it is therefore
a good proxy of the average wage of US-born workers in the city. In particular,
the construction of wct is not aﬀected by the degree of diversity of a city. The
correlation between diversity and wct comes only from the equilibrium eﬀect of
diversity on labor demand and labor supply.
A sm e a s u r eo ft h ea v e r a g el a n dr e n ti naM S Aw eu s et h ea v e r a g em o n t h l y
rent paid per room in the house (i.e., the monthly rent divided by the number
of rooms) by white US-born people in working age (16-65). We call rct such
measure for city c in year t.
Turning to our key explanatory variable, our measure of cultural diversity
considers the country of origin of people as deﬁning their cultural identity. Cul-
tural diversity is certainly a multidimensional concept and could stem from
diﬀerent ethnicity, religion, national origin or other characteristics. Here, how-
ever, we focus on diﬀerences in country of birth as such diversity is likely to
increase as a result of migration and it is highly correlated with linguistic and
national identity. foreign-born have always been an important share of the US
population and their proportion has been growing in the past decades. In 1970
they were 8 percent of the total working age population. In 1990 they reached
12 percent and they kept on growing afterwards.
To keep our dataset comparable with existing cross-country studies, we use
a rather standard measure of diversity, namely, the so called ‘index of fractional-
ization’ (henceforth, simply ‘diversity index’). Such index has been popularized
in cross-country studies by Mauro (1995) and largely used thereafter. It is
nothing but the Simpson index used to measure biodiversity and embeds the
probability that two randomly selected individuals in a community belong to
diﬀerent groups. It accounts for the two main dimensions of diversity, i.e., ‘rich-
ness’ (number of groups) and ‘evenness’ (balanced distribution of individuals
across groups).4 The index is calculated as 1 minus the Herﬁndal index of con-
centration across groups. Speciﬁcally, in the case of the variable CoB (country








i)t is the share of people born in country i among the residents of
city c in year t. This index reaches its maximum value 1 when each individual
is in a diﬀerent group, i.e. there are no individuals born in the same country,
and its minimum value 0 when all individuals belong to the same group, i.e.
all individuals were born in the same country. However, in measuring diversity
there is something speciﬁc to our data set. First, in each city the largest group,
by far, is always represented by the US-born. Second, most of the variation




i)t rather than on the variation in the countries of
4Despite diﬀerences that may seem notable at ﬁrst sight, most statistical measures of
diversity are either formally equivalent or at least highly correlated when run on the same
data set. See Maignan et al (2003) for details.
7origin. On both counts, an alternative, and sometimes preferable, measure of
diversity could simply be the share of foreign-born. We will present results using
both measures.
The 1970 and 1990 PUMS data report the country of birth of each individual.
We consider as separate groups each country of origin of migrants contributing
at least 0.5 percent of the total foreign-born living and working in the US. The
other countries of origin are gathered in a residual group. Such choice implies
t h a tw ec o n s i d e r3 5c o u n t r i e so fo r i g i ni n1 9 7 0a sw e l la si n1 9 9 0 .S u c hc h o i c e
covers about 92 percent of all foreign-born immigrants while the remaining 8
percent are merged into one group. The complete list of countries for each
census year is reported in the data appendix and the largest 15 of these groups
are reported in Table 1. As the table shows, between 1970 and 1990, the origin
of migrants has become increasingly polarized towards Mexican immigrants, but
the share of foreign-born has increased so that, overall, the diversity index has
increased. As to the main sources of immigrants, we also notice the well known
s h i f tf r o mE u r o p e a nc o u n t r i e st oA s i a na n dL a t i nA m e r i c a nc o u n t r i e s .
3.2 Diversity Across U.S. Cities
In order to convince the reader that US cities are a very diﬀerentiated universe
in terms of diversity and that there is enough variation across them to be able
to learn something precise from their analysis, Table 2 shows the percentage
of foreign-born and the Diversity Index for a group of important Metropolitan
areas.
To put into context the extent of diversity in US cities, their diversity can be
compared with the cross-country values of the index of linguistic fractionaliza-
tion reported by the Atlas Narodov Mira and published in Taylor and Hudson
(1972) for year 1960. Such values have been largely used in the growth literature
(see, e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997, and Collier, 2001). As foreign-born im-
migrants normally use their country’s mother tongue at home and in turn this
signals their country’s cultural identity, our diversity index captures cultural
and linguistic fragmentation just as that index does at the country level. The
comparison yields intriguing results. Diversiﬁed cities, such as New York or Los
Angeles, have diversity indices in the range from 0.5t o0 .6, which are compa-
rable to the values calculated for countries such as Rhodesia (0.54), which is
often disrupted by ethnic wars, or Pakistan (0.62), which also features a prob-
lematic mix of conﬂicting cultures. Afghanistan, a well known quagmire of
diﬀerent cultural identities, reaches a value of 0.66 that is only slightly higher.
More homogenous cities, such as Cincinnati and Pittsburgh, exhibit a degree of
fractionalization equal to 0.05, which is the same as that of very homogenous
European countries, such as Norway or Denmark in the sixties. Between these
two extremes US cities span a range of diversity that is about two thirds of the
range spanned by countries in the world. Table 2 also shows that, even though
people born in Mexico constitute an important group in many cities, the variety
of origin of the foreign-born migrants across US cities is still remarkable.
Finally, from Table 2 we also get the impression of a very high positive
8correlation between the share of foreign-born people in a city and its diversity
index. This conﬁrms what was anticipated above: the presence of a large share
of foreign-born, more than their group composition, is the largest source of
diversity in US cities. Over the whole sample of 160 MSAs, the correlation
coeﬃcient between the two measures is 0.86 for 1990 and 0.87 for 1990. Similarly,
for the 1970-90 period the correlation coeﬃcient between the increase in the
share of foreign-born and the increase in the diversity index is 0.84. Diﬀerently,
the correlation between the increase in the diversity index calculated for the
whole population and the diversity index calculated only within the group of
foreign-born is a mere 0.08.
3.3 Stylized Facts
Previewing the ﬁnal results of our analysis, the key empirical ﬁnding is readily
stated: keeping every other city characteristic equal, on average US-born workers
living in cities with richer cultural diversity are paid higher wages and pay higher
rents than those living in cities with poorer cultural diversity.O u rm a i ne ﬀort
in section 5 will be to show that not only is this correlation not driven by any
other (omitted) variable, but it is the result of causation running from diversity
to wages and rents. To support such eﬀort, section 4 will develop a theoretical
model arguing that, when ﬁrms and workers are freely mobile across cities, the
above ﬁnding can be explained in equilibrium only if diversity has a dominant
production amenity eﬀect.A san a t u r a lﬁrst step in that direction, the present
subsection reports the raw correlations between diversity on the one hand and
wages as well as rents on the other.
While there is a strong positive correlation in the cross section, it is more
eﬀective to report the correlation across the 160 cities between the change, from
1970 to 1990, of the share of foreign-born, ∆(Foreignc), and the percentage
change in the wage of the US-born, ∆ln( wc) ,o rt h ep e r c e n t a g ec h a n g ei nr e n t s
paid by the US-born, ∆ln( rc). Any ﬁxed characteristic of cities, such as their
location, their ﬁxed amenities (e.g., weather conditions), and their traditions,
does not aﬀect that correlation and this is why we prefer it as stylized fact.
Figure 1 and 2 show the scatter-plots for these two partial correlation and
report the OLS regression. Cities that have substantially increased their share
of foreigners in the twenty years considered, such as Los Angeles, Miami and
San Francisco, have experienced increases in wages larger than average; similarly
(with the exception of Miami) Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, and Jersey
City, which experienced a large increase in foreign-born, also experienced large
increases in rents. The OLS coeﬃcient implies that a 10 percent increase of the
share of foreign-born (the diﬀerence between, say, Oklahoma City and Chicago
in 1990) is associated with 7 percent higher wages and 11 percent higher rents
for same sized houses. Similar estimates would be obtained using the 1990 cross
section (rather than changes): a diﬀerence of 10 percent in foreign-born people
would be associated with diﬀerences of 9 percent in wages and 15 percent in
rents. The raw positive correlation is very signiﬁcant. Let us anticipate that,
even when controlling for increases in average schooling and for the change in
9city-employment, the eﬀect on wages still stands at 5.6 percent (standard error
1.6 percent). Analogously, when controlling for the changes in city population
density and in per-capita income, the eﬀect on rents still stands at 5.3 percent
(standard error 2 percent).
4 A Multicultural City System
To structure our empirical investigation, we develop a stylized model of an open
system of cities in which ‘diversity’ aﬀects both the productivity of ﬁrms and the
satisfaction of consumers through a localized external eﬀect. Both the model
and the identiﬁcation procedure of the impact of diversity on city dwellers build
on Roback (1982).
4.1 The Model
We consider an open system of a large number N of non-overlapping cities,
indexed by c =1 ,...,N. There are two factors of production, labor and land.
Labor is perfectly mobile between and within cities. We assume that intercity
commuting costs are prohibitive so that for any worker the cities of work and
residence coincide. We also ignore intra-city commuting costs, which allows us
to focus on the intercity allocations of workers.
The overall amount of labor available in the economy is equal to L.I ti si n -
elastically supplied by urban residents and, without loss of generality, we choose
units such that each resident supplies one unit of labor. Accordingly, we call Lc
the number of workers employed and resident in city c. Workers are all identical
in terms of attributes that are relevant for market interactions. However, they
diﬀer in terms of non-market attributes, which exogenously classiﬁes them into
M diﬀerent groups (‘cultural identities’) indexed by i =1 ,...,M. Hence, calling
Li the overall number of workers belonging to group i,w eh a v e
PM
i=1 Li = L.
In each city cultural diversity dc, measured in terms of the number (‘richness’)
and relative sizes Lic (‘evenness’) of resident groups, enters both production and
consumption as an externality that, in principle, can be positive (‘amenity’) or
negative (‘disamenity’). To establish the existence and the sign of such exter-
nality is the ﬁnal aim of the paper. Diﬀerently from labor, land is ﬁxed among
cities. It is nonetheless mobile between uses within the same city. We call Hc
t h ea m o u n to fl a n da v a i l a b l ei nc i t yc. As to land ownership, we assume that
the land of a city is owned by locally resident landlords.5
To summarize, while the intercity allocation of land is exogenously given,
the intercity allocation of labor will be endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Accordingly, while the city system as a whole is characterized by an exogenous
5This assumption is made only for analytical convenience. What is crucial for what follows
is that the rental income of workers, if any, is independent of locations and, thus, it does not
aﬀect the migration choice. The alternative assumptions of absentee landlords or balanced
ownership of land across all cities would also serve that purpose.
10degree of cultural diversity, within city diversity is endogenously determined by
the entry decisions of ﬁrms and the migration decision of workers.
Preferences are deﬁned over the consumption of land H and a homogeneous
good Y that is freely traded among cities. Speciﬁcally, the utility of a typical






with 0 <µ<1. In (2) Hic and Yic are land and good consumption respec-
tively while Au(dc) captures the consumption externality associated with local
diversity dc.I ft h eﬁrst derivative A0
u(dc) is positive, diversity is a consumption
amenity; if negative it is a consumption disamenity.
We assume that workers move to the city that oﬀers them the highest indirect
utility. Given (2), utility maximization yields:
rcHic =( 1− µ)Eic,p cYic = µEic (3)
which implies that the indirect utility of the typical worker of group i in city c
is:








where Eic is her expenditures while rc and pc are the local land rent and good
price respectively.
As to production, good Y is supplied by perfectly competitive ﬁrms using
both land and labor as inputs. The typical ﬁrm in city c produces according to
the following technology:
Yjc = AY (dc)H1−α
jc Lα
jc (5)
with 0 < α < 1. In (5) Hjc and Ljc are land and labor inputs respectively
while AY (dc) captures the production externality associated with local diversity
dc.I f A0
Y (dc) is positive, diversity is a production amenity; if negative it is a
production disamenity.
Given (5) and perfect competition, proﬁt maximization yields:
rcHjc =( 1− α)pcYjc,w cLjc = αpcYjc (6)





(1 − α)1−αααAY (dc)
(7)
so that ﬁrms make no proﬁts in equilibrium. Given our assumption on land
ownership, this implies that aggregate expenditures in the city equal local factor
incomes and that workers’ expenditures consist of wages only: Eic = wc.A s
good Y is freely traded, its price is the same everywhere. We choose the good
as numeraire, which allow us to write pc =1 . 6
6Anticipating the empirical implementation of the model, by setting pc = 1 for all cities
we are requiring the law-of-one-price to hold for tradable goods and non-tradable goods prices
t ob er e a s o n a b l yp r o x i e db yl a n dr e n t s . T h i ss e e m st ob es u p p o r t e db yt h el a r g ep o s i t i v e
correlation between local price indices and land rents at the SMSA level.
11In a spatial equilibrium there exists a set of prices (wc, rc, c =1 ,...,N)
such that in all cities workers and landlords maximize their utilities given their
budget constraints, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts given their technological constraints,
factor and product markets clear. Moreover, no ﬁrm has an incentive to exit
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We will refer to (8) as the ‘free entry conditions’. Finally, in a spatial equilibrium
no worker has an incentive to migrate. For an interior equilibrium (i.e., Lc > 0
∀c =1 ,...,N) that is the case when workers are indiﬀerent between alternative
cities:
Vic = Vik, ∀c,k =0 ,...,N (9)
We will refer to (9) as the ‘free migration conditions’.
To conclude the solution of the model we have to determine the spatial
allocation of workers Lic. This is achieved by evaluating the implications of
market clearing for factor prices. Speciﬁcally, given Lc =
P
j Ljc and Yc = P




i Hic, (6) and (3)
imply µrcHc =( 1−αµ)pcYc.T o g e t h e rw i t hEic = wc and pc =1 ,t h o s er e s u l t s











Substituting (10) into (9) completes the system of equations that can be solved
for the equilibrium spatial allocation of workers. In particular, such substitution
gives M(N −1) free migration conditions that, together with the M group-wise
full-employment conditions
PN
c=1 Lic = Li,a s s i g nLic mobile workers of each
group i =1 ,..,M to each city c =1 ,...,N.
Due to constant returns to scale and ﬁxed land, (10) shows that the indirect
utility oﬀered to a worker in each city is a decreasing function of the total number
of local workers. This ensures the uniqueness of the spatial equilibrium in terms
of city sizes Lc’s. Moreover, (10) also shows that the local indirect utility tends
to inﬁnity as all workers abandon a certain city, which ensures that the unique
equilibrium has indeed a positive number of workers in every city (‘no ghost
town’). Finally, whether in equilibrium cities have a more or less diversiﬁed
group composition (dc high or low), depends on the combined consumption and
production external eﬀects of diversity AU(dc)[AY (dc)]
µ.I fs u c hc o m b i n a t i o n
generates a net amenity eﬀect, cities will tend to be diversiﬁed; if it generates
a net disamenity eﬀect, they will tend to be homogeneous. More precisely, due
to symmetry among groups, in the presence of a net amenity eﬀect of diversity,
cities will have a uniform distribution of workers across groups (‘multicultural
cities’); if a net disamenity eﬀect arises, diﬀerent groups will tend to concentrate
in diﬀerent cities (‘unicultural cities’).7
7In the case of net amenity, the multicultural equilibrium conﬁguration is unique. In the
124.2 Identiﬁcation: Wage and Rent Equations
To prepare the model for empirical investigation, it is useful to evaluate wages
and land rents at the equilibrium allocation. This is achieved by solving together
the logarithmic versions of the free entry condition (8) and the free mobility
condition (9) that takes (4) into account. Speciﬁcally, call v the equilibrium
value of indirect utility. Due to free mobility such value, call it v, is common
among cities and, due to the large number of cities, it is unaﬀected by city-level
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and the ‘wage equation’:
lnwc =













where ηY ≡ ln(1 − α)1−ααα and ηU ≡ (1 − µ)1−µµµ/v.
Equations (11) and (12) constitute the theoretical foundations of our follow-
ing regressions. They capture the equilibrium relation between diversity and
factor prices. In the wake of Roback (1982), they have to be estimated together
since they clearly show that any regression of one equation alone runs into a
problem of lack of identiﬁcation. To see this, consider (11) in isolation. A
positive correlation between dc and rc is consistent with both a dominant con-
sumption amenity eﬀect of diversity (A0
U(dc) > 0) and a dominant production
amenity eﬀect (A0
Y (dc) > 0). Analogously, if one considers (12) in isolation, a
positive correlation between dc and wc is consistent with both a dominant con-
sumption disamenity eﬀect (A0
U(dc) < 0) and a dominant production amenity
eﬀect (A0
Y (dc) > 0). Only the joint estimation of (11) and (12) allows one to
establish which eﬀect is indeed dominating. Speciﬁcally:
∂ rc
∂ dc
> 0a n d
∂ wc
∂ dc
> 0i ﬀdominant production amenity (A0
Y (dc) > 0) (13)
∂ rc
∂ dc
> 0a n d
∂ wc
∂ dc




< 0a n d
∂ wc
∂ dc
< 0i ﬀdominant production disamenity (A0
Y (dc) < 0)
∂ rc
∂ dc
< 0a n d
∂ wc
∂ dc
> 0i ﬀdominant consumption disamenity (A0
U(dc) < 0)
Figure 3 provides a graphical intuition of the proposed identiﬁcation. In the
ﬁgure wc and rc are measured along the horizontal and vertical axes respectively.
case of net disamenity, the unicultural equilibrium conﬁguration is unique if there are more
cities than groups (N ≥ M): any city hosts only one group of workers. On the contrary, if
there are more groups than cities, N<M multiple equilibria exist as some groups have to
coexist within the same city.
13For given v and diversity dc, the free entry condition (8) is met along the
downward sloping curve, while the free migration condition (9) holds along the
upward sloping curve. The equilibrium factor prices are found at the intersection
of the two curves. Diversity dc acts as a shift parameter on the two curves: any
shock to diversity shifts both curves. An increase in dc shifts (8) up (down) if
diversity has a production amenity (disamenity) eﬀect. It shifts (9) up (down)
if diversity has a consumption amenity (disamenity) eﬀect. Thus, by looking
at the impact of a diversity shock on the equilibrium wage and rent, we are
able to identify the dominant eﬀect of diversity. For example, consider the
initial equilibrium A and the new equilibrium A0 that prevails after a shock to
diversity. In A0 both wc and rc have risen. Our identiﬁcation argument states
that both factor prices rise if and only if an upward shift of (8) dwarfs any shift
of (9), i.e., the production amenity eﬀect dominates.
With respect to Roback (1982), however, we face an additional problem.
While her focus is on ﬁxed amenities (e.g., “clean air”, “lack of severe snow
storms”, Roback, 1982, p.1260-61), diversity in our model is endogenous since
it is determined by the migration decisions of workers. This implies that, in
order to test any causal relation from diversity to wages and rents, diversity has
to be instrumented. We will take due account of this endogeneity problem in
subsection 5.3.8
5 Wage and Rent Regressions
The theoretical model provides us with a consistent framework to structure our
empirical analysis. In particular, in the wake of Roback (1982) it suggests how
to use wage and rent regressions to identify the external eﬀect of diversity on
production and consumption.
5.1 Basic Speciﬁcations
Our units of observation are the 160 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)
listed in the Appendix. The years of observation are 1970 and 1990. As an
empirical implementation of the wage equation (12), we run the following basic
regression:
ln(wc,t)=β1 (sc,t)+β2 ln(Emplc,t)+β3div(CoB)c,t + ec + et + ect (14)
The dependent variable wc,t is the average wage in city c in year t.T h a t i s
measured as the average wage of US-born white males between 40 and 50 years
of age (see Section 3.1 for details). This allows us to avoid issues of age, gender,
and race composition. The focal independent variable is div(CoB)c,t,w h i c hi s
the diversity index deﬁned in equation (1). The other independent variables
8See, e.g., Glaeser and Mar´ e (2001) for a discussion of the many pitfalls in estimating wage
equations when ﬁrms and workers are mobile.
14are controls. Speciﬁcally, sc,t measures the average years of schooling for the
group of white US-born males aged from 40 to 50. Emplc,t is total non-farm
employment in city c and year t. We control for unobserved factors that may
vary across cites (and not over time) such as location, climate and traditions by
including 160 city ﬁxed eﬀects ec. We also control for common eﬀects over time
(such as the generalized increase in immigrants as well as in wages and rents)
by including a year dummy et. Finally, ect is a zero-mean random error term
independent from the other regressors.
Under this assumption, the coeﬃcient β3 captures the equilibrium eﬀect on
wages of a change in cultural diversity. However, as discussed in the subsection
4.2, the sign of β3 cannot be directly interpreted as evidence of any amenity
eﬀect of diversity. The reason is that it may signal either a dominant positive
external eﬀect of diversity in production, which increases labor demand, or a
dominant negative external eﬀect of diversity in consumption, which decreases
labor supply. Identiﬁcation, thus, requires to estimate a parallel rent regression.
Based on the rent equation (11), we run the basic regression:
ln(rc,t)=γ1 ln(y)c,t + γ2 ln(Popc,t)+γ3div(CoB)c,t + εc + εt + εct (15)
The dependent variable rc,t is the average monthly rent per room paid by white
US-born males in city c in year t. The focal independent variable is again
the diversity index div(CoB)c,t. The other independent variables are controls.
Speciﬁcally, (y)c,t is the average yearly income of the group of white US-born
males in city c in year t, while Popc,t is the population density in the city. Again
we control for city ﬁxed eﬀects εc,ay e a rd u m m yεt,a n dw ea s s u m et h a tεct is
a zero-mean random error uncorrelated with the regressors. The coeﬃcient γ3
captures the equilibrium eﬀect of a change in cultural diversity on average city
rents. Then, by crossing the information on the signs of β3 and γ3,w ea r ea b l e
to use (13) to identify the net external eﬀect of diversity: dominant production
amenity if and only if β3 > 0a n dγ3 > 0; dominant consumption amenity if
and only if β3 < 0a n dγ3 > 0; dominant production disamenity if and only if
β3 < 0a n dγ3 < 0; dominant consumption disamenity if and only if β3 > 0a n d
γ3 < 0.
The results of the regressions (14) and (15) are reported in Table 3 and 4
respectively. These results are obtained by OLS estimation with city and time
ﬁxed eﬀects while correcting the standard errors to be heteroskedasticity robust.
In Table 3, Speciﬁcation 1 is exactly the one described in (14). Returns to one
year of schooling are estimated around 10 percent and the change in employment
is not signiﬁcantly correlated with wages. The diversity index has a positive and
very signiﬁcant eﬀect with an estimate of β3 equal to 1.29 (standard error 0.29).
In Speciﬁcation 2 we decompose the eﬀect of diversity into the eﬀect of the
increased share of foreign-born and the eﬀect of increased diversity among the
foreign-born. Both measures have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages, but
the eﬀect from increased share of foreign-born is much more precisely estimated
at 0.58 with standard error 0.1. Increased diversity of foreigners has an impact
15signiﬁcant at the 10-per-cent level only. Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 estimate the
eﬀect of diversity on the average income of white US-born males with 40 to 50
years of age, which includes returns to capital and entrepreneurship. As long as
diversity acts as a local production externality, its eﬀect should also aﬀect these
returns. Reassuringly diversity has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on personal
income as well, and even larger than on wage income. According to the estimates
in Speciﬁcation 3, increasing the diversity index by 10 percent would cause an
increase in average personal income of US-born by 15 percent. Decomposing the
eﬀect of diversity into the eﬀects of the share of foreign-born and of diversity
among foreign-born, the former turns out to be the key component while the
latter eﬀect is positive but not signiﬁcant. An increase in foreign-born by 10
percent would increase average personal income of US-born by 8.2 percent.
Vis a vis the positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of diversity on wages, it is then
crucial for identiﬁcation to measure the impact of diversity on rents. Table 4
reports the results from the rent regression (15). Speciﬁc a t i o n1a n d2c o n t r o l
only for population density plus city and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Speciﬁcation 3
and 4 control for personal income too. Again we estimate the eﬀect of overall
diversity (Speciﬁcations 1 and 3) and then we decompose it into the eﬀects of
the share of foreign-born and of diversity of foreign-born (Speciﬁcations 2 and
4). Considering the impact of the share of foreign-born, which turns out to be
the most important component of diversity, when we do not control for personal
income (Speciﬁcation 2), an increase of the share of foreign-born by 10 percent is
associated with an increase in rents for US-born close to 11 percent. As reported
in Table 3, though, an increase in diversity is associated with an increase in
personal income so that the eﬀect on rents may be a consequence of higher
average income in the city without any independent additional eﬀect. However,
when we control for average income of the US-born group (Speciﬁcation 4), we
still have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on US-born rents although half the
size of the one estimated in Speciﬁcation 1. An increase of the share of foreign-
born by 10 percent would increase price of housing by 5.3 percent, even after
controlling for the fact that higher diversity is associated with higher income,
and 1 percent higher income generates 0.6 percent higher rents.
To sum up, diversity has positive and highly signiﬁcant correlations with
both wage (β3 > 0) and land rent (γ3 > 0). According to (13), such posi-
tive correlations can be interpreted as consistent with a dominant production
amenity eﬀect of diversity. To gain further insight on this result, the rest of
the paper is devoted to two tasks. First, in Section 5.2 we check whether those
positive correlations survive the inclusion of several additional controls. Second,
in Section 5.3 we tackle the issue of endogeneity raised at the end of Section
4.2. In particular, we try to assess the causal direction of those correlations by
instrumental variables techniques.
Before doing that, however, let us check another correlation that may re-
inforce our interpretation that the positive eﬀects on wages and rents are the
equilibrium result of a dominant production amenity. The theoretical model
makes clear (see (6)) that, in the presence of a production amenity, labor de-
mand would shift up in cities where diversity increased. Table 5 reports the
16correlation between changes in diversity and changes in employment as well as
population of US cities between 1970 and 1990. If the labor supply curve had
shifted up with labor demand unchanged, that would have caused the observed
increase in wages but this would have been associated with a decrease in em-
ployment. On the contrary, Table 5 shows mildly positive eﬀects of diversity
on employment and population, not signiﬁcant the former and signiﬁcant the
latter. Such results, therefore, point to some dominant upward shift of labor
demand as expected in the presence of a dominant production amenity.
5.2 Check of Robustness
Our basic speciﬁcations for the wage and rent regressions omit several variables
that, in principle, could aﬀect both the degree of diversity and local externalities.
In so far as they change over time, the impacts of such omitted variables are
not captured by the city ﬁxed eﬀects.
This section is devoted to testing whether the estimated eﬀects of diversity
are robust to the inclusion of omitted variables. While the list of potential
controls is never complete, we include here some important ones for which one
can think of plausible stories that wouldl e a dt ot h ee s t i m a t e dc o r r e l a t i o n s .
Table 6 reports the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the diversity index, the share
of foreign-born, and foreign-born diversity in the wage equation as we include
additional controls, one at a time and together. Table 7 presents analogous
results for the rent regression.
In addition, our theoretical model shows that equilibrium wages and rents
are simultaneously determined. This suggests that there may be correlation
between the unobservable idiosyncratic shocks to wages, εct,a n dr e n t s ,ect.T o
deal with this potential source of ineﬃciency in OLS estimations, Table 8 reports
the coeﬃcients of the diversity index or the share of foreign-born in the wage
and rent equations when simultaneously estimated by SUR.
5.2.1 Skills’ Complementarity/Externality from Foreign-Born
The positive eﬀect of the foreign-born on the US-born wage could simply be a re-
sult of the foreigners’ measurable skills. If the foreign-born had higher (or lower)
schooling achievements than US-born, then, through some complementarity or
externality eﬀects, that could increase the wages of the US-born independently
from any role of diversity. Ciccone and Peri (2002) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant comple-
mentarity between human capital and labor in US cities and Moretti (2003)
ﬁnds signiﬁcant externalities from schooling. Thus, there is some ground to
suspect that we might be attributing to diversity an eﬀect more simply due to
the observable levels of schooling of the foreign-born.
Speciﬁcations (2) in Tables 6 and 7 include the average years of schooling
of the foreign-born as a control variable in the wage and rent regressions re-
spectively. The eﬀect of diversity is still signiﬁc a n ta n dp o s i t i v ei nb o t hc a s e s .
Interestingly, the eﬀect (not reported) of average schooling of the foreign-born
on the wages of the US-born is not signiﬁcant, while it is small and positive on
17US-born rents. When decomposing the overall diversity eﬀect (column 2 and
3 in the tables) we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect of the share of foreign-
born on both rents and wages, while the diversity of foreigners has signiﬁcant
positive impact on wages but not on rents. As in most speciﬁcations, in this
case too the estimated eﬀect implies that an increase of 10 percent in the share
of foreign-born increases average US-born wages as well as rents by 5.8.
5.2.2 Unobserved Shocks to Productivity and Amenities
Another plausible reason to ﬁnd positive correlations of diversity with wages
and rents may be that migration into the city responds to positive shocks to
productivity and local amenities. In so far as we do not observe these shocks, we
are omitting the common underlying cause of increased wages, increased rents,
and increased diversity. To address this issue we use two strategies. The ﬁrst
strategy, which we postpone to Section 5.3, tries to identify a variable correlated
(or more correlated) with the share of foreign-born but not otherwise correlated
with productivity or amenities. Then, it uses such variable as instrument for
the estimation.
The second strategy, pursued here, exploits the fact that, if shocks to pro-
ductivity attract workers into a city, this should work for US-born as well as for
foreign-born workers. Therefore, if we included the share of US-born citizens
coming from out of state (i.e., born in a diﬀerent state than the state of the
city of residence) in the wage and rent regressions, such variable should be cor-
related with productivity and amenities shocks too, and therefore its inclusion
should decrease signiﬁcantly the estimated coeﬃcients β3 and γ3.M o r e o v e r ,w e
should ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive correlation between wages as well as rents and
the share of people born out of state. Speciﬁcation (3) in Tables 6 and 7 in-
clude the share of US-born citizens who were born out of state. The coeﬃcients
on this variable (not reported) are not signiﬁcant in either regression, while
the eﬀects of diversity and of the share of foreign-born on wages and rents are
still signiﬁcantly positive and virtually unchanged. These results suggest that
the presence of the foreign-born does not simply signal that cities have some
unobserved positive characteristics that would lure both foreign- and US-born
workers.
5.2.3 Tolerance for Diversity
Some sociologists have advanced the hypothesis that environments that are
tolerant towards diversity are more productive and more pleasant to live in:
they are more open to contribution of ideas from diﬀerent groups and they are
more amenable. Along these lines Richard Florida (see, e.g., Florida, 2002) has
argued that cities where the number of artists and bohemian professionals is
larger are more innovative in high tech sectors. It is quite likely that part of
our correlations may actually depend on this good attitude of cities towards
diversity. However, to show that there is nonetheless something speciﬁct ot h e
presence of foreign-born in generating the positive correlation of diversity with
18wages and rents, we include another measure of diversity in our regressions.
The share of US-born people identifying themselves as ‘non-white’, is en-
tered in speciﬁcation (4) of Tables 6 and 7. Since we consider only US-born
people, such index essentially captures the white-black composition of a city.
The coeﬃcients (not reported) on this variable turn out to be positive in the
wage regression (0.20) and negative in the rent regression (−0.22). According
to (13), this would suggest a dominant consumption disamenity eﬀect of the
share of non-white US-born. While it might be tempting to read this result as
evidence of the aversion of white US-born against living close to large non-white
communities, the standard errors (in both cases around 0.2) make the estimated
coeﬃcients not signiﬁcant.
As to the coeﬃcients of the diversity index and of the share of foreign-born,
they are still positive, signiﬁcant (except in one case for the rent regression), and
similar to previous estimates. Thus, independently from the impact of diversity
along the ethnic dimension, diversity in terms of the country of birth maintains
its own importance and speciﬁcity.
5.2.4 Quality of Local Public Goods
Several public services in US cities are supplied by local governments. Public
schools, public health care, and public security are all desirable local services.
Therefore, cities where their quality has improved in the period of observation
may have experienced both an increase in the share of foreign-born (possibly
larger users of these services) and a rise in property values. From the County
and City Databook we have gathered data on the spending of local government
p e rp e r s o ni nac i t ya n do ni t sb r e a k d o w na c r o s sd i ﬀerent categories such as
education, health care, and security (local police). Speciﬁcation (5) includes
overall spending by local government whereas Speciﬁcation (6) includes spend-
ing on education, a very important determinant of the quality of schools, which
in turn largely aﬀects property value.
Once more, while the eﬀect of public spending per person on rents (not
reported) is positive in both speciﬁcations, the inclusion of the controls does
not change the eﬀect of diversity. In particular, the coeﬃcient on the share of
foreign-born is around 0.6 (standard error 0.17) in the wage regression and 0.53
(standard error 0.24) in the rent regression. As a ﬁnal and most conservative
check, Speciﬁcation (7) includes together all the controls included separately in
speciﬁcations from 2 to 6. Reassuringly, the coeﬃcient of the share of foreign-
born is still positive, very stable, and signiﬁcant in both regressions. The coef-
ﬁcient of the diversity index is also positive, very stable, and signiﬁcant in the
wage regression while it turns out not signiﬁcant in the rent regression.9
9Some authors (see, e.g., Sivitanidou and Wheaton, 1992) have argued that also the in-
stitutional constraints on land use (‘zoning’) can aﬀect land values. Thus, higher property
values may be associated with more eﬃcient institutional constraints in the presence of market
failures. Also this eﬀect should be captured by our local public goods measures.
195.2.5 Outliers and State by Year Fixed Eﬀects
In the last two speciﬁcations of Tables 6 and 7 we try to push our data as far as
they can go. Speciﬁcation (8) estimates the wage and rent regressions excluding
the three states with the highest shares of foreign-born, namely California, New
York and Florida. The aim is to check whether few highly diverse cities in those
states generate the correlations of diversity with wages and rents estimated for
the whole data set. This is not the case. In the wage regression the coeﬃcient
of diversity decreases somewhat but remains both positive and signiﬁcant. In
the rent equation the coeﬃcient of diversity becomes much larger but also much
less precisely estimated. In general, however, there is no evidence that in the
long run the eﬀect of diversity is diﬀerent for high immigration states than for
low immigration states.
In Speciﬁcation (9), rather than the panel with city and year dummies, we
use instead the diﬀerences between 1990 and 1970 of the basic variables. We
also include state ﬁxed eﬀects to control for diﬀerences in state-speciﬁcg r o w t h
rates of wages and rents. In so doing we identify the eﬀects of diversity on wages
and rents through the variation across cities within states. Indeed, the inclusion
of state ﬁxed eﬀects in the diﬀerence regression is equivalent to the inclusion
of state by time ﬁxed eﬀects in the panel regression. This is an extremely
conservative speciﬁcation as we are probably eliminating a lot of the variation
needed to identify the results and we are estimating 48 dummies using 160
observations. Remarkably, the positive eﬀect of diversity on productivity still
stands and its point estimate is similar to those of previous speciﬁcations. The
eﬀect of diversity on rents, however, while still positive, is no longer signiﬁcant.
5.2.6 Eﬃcient Estimation: SUR
The theoretical model shows that in equilibrium wages and rents are simulta-
neously determined (see equations (11) and (12)). This implies that there may
be correlation between the unobservable idiosyncratic shocks to wages, εct,a n d
rents, ect. If so, we could increase the eﬃciency of our estimates by explicitly
accounting for such correlation and estimating the wage and rent equations as
a system through SUR. While OLS estimates are still consistent and unbiased
even when εct and ect are correlated, SUR estimates are more eﬃcient.
Table 8 reports the coeﬃcients on the diversity index or the share of foreign-
born in the wage and rent equations when estimated simultaneously by SUR.
Speciﬁcations (1) through (9) are identical to (1) through (9) in Tables 6 and 7.
In general, the estimates of the coeﬃcients on the diversity index are somewhat
larger when using SUR in both the wage and the rent equations. When we
use the share of foreign-born instead, the estimated coeﬃcients are similar to
the OLS results for wages but somewhat higher for rents. Indeed, while the
elasticity of wages to the share of foreign-born is between 0.6a n d0 .7 in most
speciﬁcations (just as in Table 6), the elasticity of rents is between 0.6a n d1 .1
(versus 0.6 − 0.8 in Table 7). The only case in which the eﬀect of diversity on
wages is only borderline signiﬁcant is when we exclude the large immigration
20states (just as in the OLS estimates). As to rents, the eﬀect of diversity is
not signiﬁcant only when we introduce state-speciﬁc trends (again, as in the
OLS estimates). Therefore, SUR estimates strongly conﬁrm the qualitative and
quantitative results obtained under OLS.
5.2.7 Overview of Robustness Checks
To summarize the results of our robustness checks, in Tables 6, 7 and 8 most
wage and rent regressions yield positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for both the
diversity index and the share of foreign-born. In only one case (Speciﬁcation
(8)) the OLS estimates of the single wage regression produce an insigniﬁcant
eﬀect of the share of foreign-born. In only three cases the coeﬃcient of diver-
sity (Speciﬁcations (4), (7), (9)) or the coeﬃcient of the share of foreign-born
(Speciﬁcation (9)) are not signiﬁcant in the OLS estimates of the single rent
regression. As to SUR estimation, in Table 8 only two speciﬁcations ﬁnd an
insigniﬁcant eﬀect of diversity either on wages (Speciﬁcation (8)) or on rents
(Speciﬁcation (9)). We do not ﬁnd any speciﬁcation such that the coeﬃcients
of the same variable are simultaneously not signiﬁcant in both wage and rent
regressions.
Therefore, our identiﬁcation (13) allows us to conclude that all speciﬁcations
support the hypothesis of a production amenity value of diversity. Indeed, by
using Figure 3, in subsection 4.2 we have already argued that, when the coef-
ﬁcients of our diversity measures are positive and signiﬁcant in both the wage
and the rent regressions, this is evidence of a dominant production amenity (see
point A0). In addition, it is readily established that a signiﬁcant positive impact
of diversity on wages and no signiﬁcant impact on rents is consistent only with a
production amenity and a consumption disamenity (see point B). Analogously,
as i g n i ﬁcant positive impact of diversity on rents and no signiﬁcant impact on
wages is consistent only with both a production amenity and a consumption
amenity (see point C).
5.3 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables
Short of a randomized experiment in which diversity across cities is changed ex-
ogenously and randomly, we cannot rest assured that our correlations reveal any
causal link from diversity to wages and rents. Nonetheless, some steps towards
tackling such endogeneity problem can be taken by instrumental variables (IV)
estimation. Our instruments should be correlated with the change in diversity of
cities in the 1970-1990 and not otherwise correlated with changes in wages and
rents. We propose two instruments satisfying the foregoing properties. Both
exploit the fact that, presumably exogenously from the characteristics of any
single city, the overall immigration to the US increased signiﬁcantly between
1970 and 1990.
215.3.1 Ports of entry
To construct the ﬁrst instrumental variable, we build on the fact that immigrants
tend to enter the US through few ‘ports of entry’. Each year the US Oﬃce of
Tourism publishes the percentage of inbound travellers by port of entry. Look-
ing at the data for the eighties, we see that the three main gateways were New
York, Miami, and Los Angeles. Through the airports and ports of these cities
about 30 percent of the foreign (immigrant and non-immigrant) travellers en-
tered the US. Accordingly, foreign-born immigrants from countries other than
Canada or Mexico were quite likely to go through one of those cities. Moreover,
due to networks, costs of travelling, and costs of spreading information, such
immigrants were more likely to settle down in cities closer to those gateways.
Therefore, cities at a smaller distance from those ports of entry were more likely
to receive foreign-born immigrants during the 1970-1990 period. A similar ar-
gument can be made for Canadian and Mexican immigrants. For them it seems
reasonable to assume that the US borders with their own countries constitute
their natural port of entry. Thus, as before, cities at a smaller distance from the
borders were more likely to receive Canadian and Mexican immigrants during
the 1970-1990 period.
Such considerations suggest the use of the overall distance of a city from the
main ‘ports of entry’ (New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and the US borders with
Canada and Mexico) to instrument its share of foreign-born or its diversity
index. On the one hand, such distance should be negatively correlated with
diversity. As stated above, cities closer to the ports of entry experienced larger
inﬂows of foreign-born in the 1970-1990 period. On the other hand, during the
same period the distance of a city from the ports of entry should also be little
correlated with changes in its wages and rents.
This strategy is open to an obvious critique. If, for example, the three cities
(New York, Miami, and Los Angeles) had experienced above average growth
in the considered time period, this could have had positive spillover eﬀects on
nearby cities. As a result, the distance of a city from them would be negatively
correlated with the increases in wages and rents due to the spillovers. To see
whether this indeed happened in our data set, we have calculated employment
growth for the three cities in the period of observation. It turns out that in
each of those three cities employment growth was actually lower than average
(respectively, +45 percent in Los Angeles, +42 percent in Miami, and a mere
+7 percent in New York, against an average +48 percent). Also population
growth was below average in both New York and Los Angeles, while it was
above average in Miami. Therefore, overall the three cities did not really grow
faster than other cities. However, since Miami still exhibited better performance
than the other two ports of entry, we have also used only distances from New
York and Los Angeles as instruments: the results are virtually unchanged.
Table 9 and 10 report the ﬁrst and second stage estimates of the described
IV regression. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic speciﬁcation; columns 3 and
4 include 48 state ﬁxed-eﬀects; columns 5 and 6 exclude all the coastal cities
from the regression to make sure that our results are not simply driven by the
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inland. The ﬁrst stage regressions conﬁrm that our instruments are excellent
and explain about 50 percent of the variation of diversity across cities. Farther
from the ports of entry diversity is signiﬁcantly lower.
Considering speciﬁcations 1 and 2, we ﬁnd that the OLS results are con-
ﬁrmed, the eﬀect of the share of foreign-born on wages and rents across cities
is positive and signiﬁcant. Moreover, the IV estimates are somewhat higher
than the OLS ones, so that we are reassured that endogeneity did not cause a
signiﬁcant OLS bias. Again, the coeﬃcients on the wage regression conﬁrm that
an increase in foreign-born by 1 percent is associated with 0.7 percent increase
in wages. As for the rents, the impact is around 1 percent. For the wage re-
gressions we obtain a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect of diversity also when controlling
for 48 state ﬁxed eﬀects (speciﬁcations 2 and 3) and when we eliminate coastal
cities (speciﬁcations 5 and 6). These last two speciﬁcations have quite large
standard errors, however, but certainly reinforce our thesis that foreign-born
have a positive eﬀect also in non-coastal cities. As to the rent regressions, the
share of foreigners has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect in speciﬁcation 2 and 6.
When we include state dummies, the eﬀect of foreign-born is not signiﬁcant any
longer (but still positive) as in Table 7. Again, the estimates on non-coastal
cities have large standard errors but the coeﬃcient estimate on the share of
foreign-born is robustly positive and close to one. Diﬀerently, the coeﬃcient of
the diversity index is positive and signiﬁcant only for non-coastal cities.
5.3.2 Shift-Share Methodology
A second instrumental variable, independent of idiosyncratic city shocks to
wages and rents, could be constructed by adopting the ‘shift-share method-
ology’ used by Card (2001) and, more recently, applied also by Saiz (2003b) to
migration in MSAs. Immigrants tend to settle where other immigrants from
the same country already reside. Therefore, we can use the share of residents
of an MSA in 1970 born in each country to attribute to each group the growth
rate of its share within the whole US population in the 1970-1990. In so doing
we compute the predicted composition of the city based on its 1970 composi-
tion and attributing to each group the average growth rate of its share in the
US population. Once we have constructed these ‘predicted’ shares for 1990
we can calculate the ‘attributed’ diversity index and the ‘attributed’ share of
foreign-born for each city in 1990.
L e tu su s et h en o t a t i o ni n t r o d u c e di ns e c t i o n3 . 1w h e r e( CoBc
j)t labels the




j)t is the share of people born in country j among US
residents in year t so that between 1970 and 1990 its growth rate is:
(gj)1970−90 =[ ( CoBj)1990 − (CoBj)1970]/(CoBj)1970 (16)
This allows us to calculate the ‘attributed’ share of people born in country j
and residing in city c in 1990 as:
( d CoBc
j)1990 =( CoBc
j)1970 • [1 + (gj)1970−90]( 1 7 )
23The attributed share of foreign-born and the attributed diversity index can
evaluated accordingly. In particular, the latter equals:






As the attributed values for each city in 1990 are built using the city’s shares
in 1970 and the national growth rates of groups from 1970 to 1990, they are
independent from any city-speciﬁc event that period. Thus, being orthogonal
to city-speciﬁc shocks, they can be used as instruments for the actual values.
Table 11 and 12 present the results of the IV estimation of the wage and
rent regressions using the shift-share instruments. Unfortunately in terms of
perfect comparability with previous results, some adjustments in the grouping
of countries of birth is unavoidable. The reason is that, as we input the shares
in 1990 based on the initial shares in 1970 and the national growth of groups,
we need to identify the same groups across census years. This is achieved by
allocating more than one country of birth to the same group. In so doing, we
follow the classiﬁcation adopted by Card (2001), Table 5, as described in the
data appendix.
In Tables 11 and 12, columns 1 and 2 report the OLS estimates of the
basic speciﬁcations for the two measures of diversity. The point estimates of
the OLS speciﬁcation are very similar to the previous estimates (respectively
Table 3 Columns 1 and 2 and Table 4 columns 3 and 4) conﬁrming that the
reclassiﬁcation of groups has only negligible eﬀects. The ﬁrst stage regressions
shows that the attributed and the actual changes are positively correlated, with
the former explaining 30-50 percent of the variation of the latter when all states
are included.
The IV-estimated eﬀect of diversity on wages is reported in column 3 and 4
o fT a b l e1 1 .T h ee ﬀect is still positive and signiﬁcant when diversity is measured
using the diversity index (speciﬁcation 3). When we include only the share of
foreign-born as measure of diversity, however, its coeﬃcient is still positive but
the standard error increases and the estimate is not signiﬁcant. Similarly when
we exclude the high-immigration states, the eﬀect of diversity is estimated to
be positive but not signiﬁcant. However, the main problem when we exclude
California, Florida, and New York is that the instruments lose much of their
explanatory power (only 20 percent of the variance of the endogenous variable
is explained by the instrument). Therefore, insigniﬁcance is mostly driven by
large standard errors rather than by evidence of endogeneity bias (i.e., changes
in point estimates).
In Table 12 the rent regression exhibits a similar qualitative pattern but
sharper results. Using the shift-share instruments both the diversity index and
the share of foreign-born have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect (speciﬁcations 3
and 4). Also in this regression, when we exclude California, Florida, and New
York, the standard errors increase signiﬁcantly. However, the point estimates of
the eﬀect of diversity are still ﬁrmly in the positive range. Somewhat surprising
a n dp o s s i b l yd r i v e nb ys o m eo u t l i e r si st h ev e r yl a r g e( a n di m p r e c i s e l ye s t i m a t e d )
24eﬀect of diversity on rents in speciﬁcation 5. As similar results emerged in Table
10 when coastal cities were excluded.
5.3.3 Overview of Instrumental Variables
As the theoretical model makes clear, endogeneity is a potential problem for
our results. We have tackled such problem by IV estimation using two diﬀerent
sets of instruments.
When distance from the ports of entry is used, the estimated coeﬃcients of
both diversity measures are always positive and signiﬁc a n ti nt h ew a g er e g r e s -
sions. Diﬀerently, in the rent regressions they are signiﬁcant, and positive, in one
case only, namely, when we use the diversity index while excluding non-coastal
cities.
When the shift-share approach is adopted instead, we have symmetric re-
sults. In the rent regressions diversity measures have always positive and signif-
icant coeﬃcients except in one case. The exception is when we use the share of
foreign-born while excluding California, Florida, and New York, in which case
the estimated coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. Diﬀerently, in the wage regressions
the estimated coeﬃcients of the diversity measures are signiﬁcant, and positive,
in one case only, namely, when we use the diversity index without excluding
California, Florida, and New York.
All in all, these results mirror the results of the OLS regressions. In particu-
lar, in the IV regressions we ﬁnd only one speciﬁcation such that the coeﬃcients
of the same variable are simultaneously not signiﬁcant in both wage and rent
equations. This is never the case in the OLS regressions. Thus, on the basis of
the discussion in subsection 5.2.7, we can conclude that our data support the
hypothesis of a production amenity value of diversity with causation running
from diversity to the location decisions of ﬁrms and workers.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
We have developed a theoretical model of an urban system of open cities in
which cultural diversity aﬀects production and consumption as an external-
ity. In principle, the external eﬀects of diversity can be positive (‘amenity’) or
negative (‘disamenity’). Since our model handles all cases (i.e. production or
consumption amenity; production or consumption disamenity), it has allowed
us to design an identiﬁcation procedure to ﬁgure out which case receives empiri-
cal support based on cross-city wage and rent variations. Moreover, by allowing
for both ﬁrm and labor mobility, our model has also stressed the problem of
endogeneity: does diversity causes wage and rent changes or vice-versa?
We have estimated the model through wage and rent regressions across US
cities in the period 1970-1990. Either higher wage or higher rent or both have
been shown to be signiﬁcantly correlated with richer diversity. This result
has survived several robustness checks against possible alternative explanations
b a s e do no m i t t e dv a r i a b l e s .
25To investigate the direction of causality of the above correlations, we have
proposed to instrument diversity in two diﬀerent ways, both exploiting the fact
that, presumably exogenously from the characteristics of any single city, the
overall migration into the US increased signiﬁcantly between 1970 and 1990.
Both instruments support the view that, during the period of observation.
Richer diversity caused higher wages or higher rents or both for US-born resi-
dents across US cities.
Given our identiﬁcation procedure, these ﬁndings are consistent only with
a dominant production amenity eﬀect of diversity: a more multicultural urban
environment makes US-born citizens more productive. The choice of US cities as
units of observation makes this result clean from most institutional diﬀerences
that are generally shown to drive comparable cross-country studies. To the
best of our knowledge, in terms of both data and identiﬁcation procedure, our
results are new. These results shed new light on the ongoing policy debate on the
opportunity of imposing additional restrictions to migration ﬂows in developed
countries
It is worth mentioning, as a concluding remark, that while we established
t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of foreign-born residents, we did not ”open the black box”
to analyze theoretically and empirically what are the channels through which
this eﬀect works. We mentioned in the paper two interesting avenues through
which this eﬀe c tm a yw o r ka n dw eb r i e ﬂy qualify them here. First, foreign-
b o r nm a yh a v es k i l l sw h i c ha r ec o m p l e m e n t a r yt ot h o s eo fU S - b o r n . E v e na t
the same level of education, problem solving, creativity and adaptability may
diﬀer between native and foreign-born workers so that reciprocal learning may
take place. Second, foreign-born workers may provide services which are not
perfectly substitutable with those of natives. An Italian stylist, a Mexican
cook, a Russian dancer, simply provide diﬀerent services than their US-born
counterparts and, because of a taste for variety, this may increase the value
of total production. The ﬁrst eﬀect described is likely to be stronger for the
highly educated and in High Tech sectors. The second eﬀect is likely to be
important in the service sector. Suggestively, we run two separate speciﬁcations
as (14) using one time the wage of low skilled (High School educated) and the
other time that of high skilled (College educated) US-born white males 40 -50
as dependent variable10.T h ee ﬀect of the share of foreign-born is signiﬁcantly
positive on the high skilled returns (0.45 std. error 0.16) and zero on low-skilled
returns (0.16 std. error 0.23). This result suggests that foreign-born’s skills are
more complementary to highly skilled US workers and explains also why most
of the research that focused on low-skilled workers ( Borjas 1999, Card 1990)
did not ﬁnd any positive eﬀect of foreign-born. As suggestive exploration of
t h es e c o n dc h a n n e l ,w er u ns p e c i ﬁcation (14) separately on three subsamples.
One only for the Low-Tech Manufacturing sector, another for the High-Tech
Manufacturing sector and the third for the Service sector. Interestingly, the
eﬀect of the share or foreign-born workers on the average wage of US-born
10The results of these last few regressions are not reported in the tables but are available
on request.
26(white, male, 40-50) was 0.02 (std. error 0.19) in Low Tech Manufacturing,
0.55 (std. error 0.30) in High tech Manufacturing and 1.00 (std. error 0.19) in
the service sector. This again is consistent with the idea that foreigners provide
valuable complementary skills in High Tech manufacturing, but not in Low Tech
manufacturing. Even more, they provide services which are not close substitutes
with those of natives and increase substantially the productivity in the service
sector. Overall we ﬁnd our ﬁndings plausible and encouraging, leaving to future
research the important goal of pursuing further the analysis of the mechanisms
through which foreign-born residents aﬀect the US economy.
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30AD a t a A p p e n d i x
A.1 Data for MSA’s
The data on cultural diversity and foreign-born are obtained from the 1970-1990
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the US Census. We selected all people
in working age (16-65) in each year and we identiﬁed the city where they lived
using the SMSA code for 1990, while in 1970 we used the county group code to
identify the metropolitan area. We used the variable ‘Place of birth’ in order to
identify the country of origin of the person. We consider only the countries of
origin that generate at least 0.5 percent of all foreign-born in the US working
age population obtaining 35 groups for 1970 and 40 for 1990.
We use the Variable ‘Salary and Wage’ to measure the yearly wage income
of each person. We transform the wage in real 1990 US $ terms by deﬂating
it for the GDP deﬂator. To construct the average wage at the MSA level we
select only white male US-born individual between 40 and 50 years of age. They
constitute our group of homogeneous US-born citizen. The years of schooling
for individuals of this group are measured using the variable ‘higrad’ for the
1970 census, which indicates the highest grade attended, while for 1990 the
variable ‘grade completed’ is converted into years of schooling using Park (1994)
correspondence Table 4. Average rents paid by the US-born are calculated using
the group of white US-born males in working age and averaging by MSA their
gross monthly rent per room (i.e. Rent divided by number of rooms) expressed
in real 1990 US $ terms. The data on total city employment, total local public
spending, and public spending in education are from the ”County and City
Databook”.
The list of metropolitan areas used in our study is reported in the following
table.
31 
Name and state of the cities used 
Abilene, TX   Dayton-Springfield, OH    Lexington, KY    Rockford, IL   
Akron, OH   Decatur, IL    Lima, OH    Sacramento, CA   
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, 
NY  
Denver, CO    Lincoln, NE    Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI   
Albuquerque, NM   Des Moines, IA    Little Rock-North Little Rock, 
AR   
St. Louis, MO-IL   
Allentown-Bethlehem-
Easton, PA  
Detroit, MI    Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA    Salem, OR   
Altoona, PA  Duluth-Superior, MN-WI    Louisville, KY-IN    Salinas, CA   
Amarillo, TX   El Paso, TX    Lubbock, TX    Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT   
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, 
WI  
Erie, PA    Macon, GA    San Antonio, TX   
Atlanta, GA   Eugene-Springfield, OR    Madison, WI    San Diego, CA   
Atlantic-Cape May, NJ   Fayetteville, NC    Mansfield, OH    San Francisco, CA   
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC   Flint, MI    Memphis, TN-AR-MS    San Jose, CA   
Austin-San Marcos, TX   Fort Lauderdale, FL    Miami, FL    Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA   
Bakersfield, CA   Fort Wayne, IN    Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI    Santa Rosa, CA   
Baltimore, MD    Fresno, CA    Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI    Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA   
Baton Rouge, LA    Gainesville, FL    Modesto, CA    Shreveport-Bossier City, LA   
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX    Gary, IN    Monroe, LA    South Bend, IN   
Billings, MT    Grand Rapids-Muskegon-
Holland, MI   
Montgomery, AL    Spokane, WA   
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, 
MS   
Green Bay, WI    Muncie, IN    Springfield, MO   
Binghamton, NY    Greensboro--Winston-Salem-
-High Point, NC   
Nashville, TN    Stockton-Lodi, CA   
Birmingham, AL    Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, SC   
New Orleans, LA    Syracuse, NY   
Bloomington-Normal, IL    Hamilton-Middletown, OH    New York, NY    Tacoma, WA   
Boise City, ID    Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, 
PA   
Newark, NJ    Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL   
Brownsville-Harlingen-San 
Benito, TX   
Honolulu, HI    Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, VA-NC   
Terre Haute, IN   
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY    Houston, TX    Odessa-Midland, TX    Toledo, OH   
Canton-Massillon, OH    Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-
OH   
Oklahoma City, OK    Trenton, NJ   
Cedar Rapids, IA    Indianapolis, IN    Omaha, NE-IA    Tucson, AZ   
Champaign-Urbana, IL    Jackson, MI    Orlando, FL    Tulsa, OK   
Charleston-North 
Charleston, SC   
Jackson, MS    Pensacola, FL    Tuscaloosa, AL   
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock 
Hill, NC-SC   
Jacksonville, FL    Peoria-Pekin, IL    Tyler, TX   
Chattanooga, TN-GA    Jersey City, NJ    Philadelphia, PA-NJ    Utica-Rome, NY   
Chicago, IL    Johnstown, PA    Phoenix-Mesa, AZ    Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA   
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN    Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI    Pittsburgh, PA    Waco, TX   
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH    Kansas City, MO-KS    Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA    Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV   
Colorado Springs, CO    Kenosha, WI    Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, 
NC   
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA   
Columbia, MO    Knoxville, TN    Reading, PA    West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, 
FL   
Columbia, SC    Lafayette, LA    Reno, NV    Wichita, KS   
Columbus, OH    Lafayette, IN    Richmond-Petersburg, VA    Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD   
Corpus Christi, TX    Lancaster, PA    Riverside-San Bernardino, 
CA   
Wilmington, NC   
Dallas, TX    Lansing-East Lansing, MI    Roanoke, VA    York, PA   
Davenport-Moline-Rock 
Island, IA-IL   
Las Vegas, NV-AZ    Rochester, NY    Youngstown-Warren, OH   
32A.2 Grouping by Country of Birth
In Tables 1-9 we consider the diversity index constructed using 35 groups, cor-
responding to the 35 country of origin of immigrants which top the list of all
countries of origin plus a residual group called ‘others’. These 35 countries
account for more than 90 percent of all foreign-born, both in 1970 and 1990,
and a country that is not in this list supplies not more than 0.5 percent of
all foreign-born living in the US. Here is the list of the non-residual countries,
in alphabetical order. For year 1970 the countries are: Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Eng-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Scotland, Sweden, Syria, Ukraine, URSS, Yugoslavia, Oth-
ers. For 1990 the countries are: Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, England, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Hong-Kong, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, El Salvador,
Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, USSR, Vietnam, Yugoslavia.
In Tables 10 and 11, to have the same group classiﬁcation in 1970 and 1990,
we allocate more than one non-residual country to the same group based on
geographical proximity. Our ﬁfteen groups are almost the same as those deﬁned
and used in Card (2001), Table 5. This is the list: Mexico, Caribbean Coun-
tries, Central America, China-Honk Kong-Singapore, South America, South
East Asia, Korea and Japan, Philippines, Australia-New Zealand-Canada-UK,
India and Pakistan, Russia and Central Europe, Turkey, North Africa and Mid-
dle East, Northwestern Europe and Israel, South-western Europe, Sub-Saharan
Africa, Cuba.
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Foreign Born living in 161 U.S. MSA’s, 
 15 Largest Groups 1970-1990 
 
 
Source: Authors’ Elaborations on 1970 and 1990 PUMS Census Data. 
 
 
Country of Origin  Percentage of total  
Foreign Born 1970 
Country of Origin  Percentage of total  
Foreign Born 1990 
Canada  9.0%  Mexico  20.0% 
Italy  8.1%  Philippines  6.0% 
Germany  7.8%  Cuba  4.2% 
Mexico  7.3%  Germany  3.2% 
Syria  7.0%  Canada  3.2% 
Cuba  5.1%  China  2.8% 
Poland   4.5%  India  2.8% 
UK  4.4%  Viet-Nam  2.7% 
Philippine  2.3%  El Salvador  2.6% 
USSR  2.3%  Italy  2.4% 
Ireland  2.3%  Korea  2.2% 
China  2.3%  UK  2.2% 
Yugoslavia  1.7%  Japan  1.8% 
Greece  1.6%  Jamaica  1.7% 
Hungary  1.6%  Colombia  1.6% 
Foreign Born as % 
of working age total 
population , 1970 
8.0%  Foreign Born as 
% of working age 
total population , 
1990 







Diversity in some U.S. MSA’s, 1990 
Source: Authors’ Elaborations on 1970 and 1990 PUMS Census Data. 
city   Share of 
Foreign Born 
Country of Origin of the 




Atlanta, GA   5.8%  Germany,  Mexico, India, 
England, Korea 
0.11 




Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN   2.3% Germany,  England,  India, 
Canada, Viet-Nam 
0.057 
Dallas, TX   10.6%  Mexico, Salvador, Viet-
Nam, India, Germany 
0.20 
El Paso, TX   29%  Mexico, Japan, Korea, 
Canada, Panama 
0.43 
Indianapolis, IN   2.3% Germany,  England,  Korea, 
Canada, Philippines 
0.046 
Las Vegas, NE  12% Mexico,  Philippines, 
Germany, Canada, Cuba 
0.23 




New York, NY   31% Dominican  Republic, 
China, Jamaica, Italy, 
Colombia 
0.51 
Oklahoma City, OK  4.1% Mexico,  Viet-Nam, 
Germany, England, Japan 
0.08 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ   5%  Germany, India, Italy, 
England, Philippines 
0.10 
Pittsburgh, PA   2.3%  Italy, Germany, India, 
England, Canada 
0.04 
Sacramento, CA  10.6% Mexico,  Philippines, 
Germany, China, Canada 
0.19 
San Francisco, CA   30.3%  Philippines, China, Mexico, 
Salvador, Hong Kong 
0.50 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV   14.8%  Salvador, Germany, India, 
Korea, Viet-Nam 






























































Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Observations 320  320  320  320 
I and II: Dependent Variable: ln average yearly wage of white, U.S. Born,  males 40-50 
years in 1990 U.S. $. 
III and IV: Dependent Variable: ln average yearly income of white, U.S. Born, males in 
1990 U.S. $. 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
In Parenthesis: Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors. 
   37
 
Table 4 






















































Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.97 0.99 0.98 0.99 
Observations  320 320 320 320 
Dependent Variable: ln average monthly rent per room paid by white, U.S. Born, 
expressed in 1990 U.S. $. 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
In Parenthesis Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors. 









Correlation between Diversity and Employment/Population 
 





















     ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 










Wage Regression: Robustness Checks  
 












































(5) Including  Public Spending on 







(6) Including  Public Spending  in 



























Dependent Variable: ln average yearly wage to white, U.S. Born, 40-50 years old 
expressed in 1990 U.S. $. 
(1) Basic: Specification from Table 3 Column I (for coefficient 1) and Column II (for 
coefficients 2 and 3) 
(2) Includes average years of schooling of foreign born 
(3) Includes the share of U.S. born outside the state in which they live 
(4) Includes the share of non-white people in working age 
(5) Include the Spending per capita on local government services. 
(6) Includes the Spending in Education per Capita 
(7) Includes all the variables in (1)-(6) together as controls 
(8) Excluding from the regression MSAs in the biggest immigrations states (CA, FL, 
NY) 
(9) Regression in Changes including 49 State Fixed-Effects 
  
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 




Rent Regression: Robustness Checks  
 












































(5) Including  Public Spending on 







(6) Including  Public Spending  in 



























Dependent Variable: ln average monthly Rent paid by white, U.S. Born, expressed in 
1990 U.S. $. 
(1) Basic: Specification from Table 4 Column II (for coefficient 1) and Column 
IV (for coefficients 2 and 3) 
(2) Includes average years of schooling of foreign born 
(3) Includes the share of U.S. born outside the state in which they live 
(4) Includes the share of non-white people in working age 
(5) Include the Spending per capita on local government services. 
(6) Includes the Spending in Education per Capita 
(7) Includes all the variables in (1)-(6) together as controls 
(8) Excluding from the regression MSAs in the biggest immigrations states 
(CA, FL, NY) 
(9) Regression in Changes including 49 State Fixed-Effects 
  
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
In Parenthesis Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors.   41
 
Table 8 
SUR Estimation of the system of Wage and Rent equations 
 
Dependent Variable   Wage  Rents 

















































(5) Including  Public Spending on 









(6) Including  Public Spending  in 





































System estimation, Dependent variables :  
ln average yearly wage to white, U.S. Born, 40-50 years old expressed in 1990 U.S. $. 
ln average monthly Rent paid by white, U.S. Born, expressed in 1990 U.S. $. 
(1)Basic: Specification  
(2) Includes average years of schooling of foreign born 
(3) Includes the share of U.S. born outside the state in which they live 
(4) Includes the share of non-white people in working age 
(5) Include the Spending per capita on local government services. 
(6) Includes the Spending in Education per Capita 
(7) Includes all the variables in (1)-(6) together as controls 
(8) Excluding from the regression MSAs in the biggest immigrations states 
(CA, FL, NY) 
(9) Regression in Changes including 49 State Fixed-Effects 
  






































































State Fixed Effects  No  No Yes Yes No No 
R
2  0.35  0.35 0.65  0.66  0.30 0.30 
Observations  160  160 160  160  144 144 
First Stage Estimation 



















































2  0.55  0.54 0.55  0.54  0.36 0.30 
 
Dependent Variable: Change between 1970 and 1990 in ln average yearly wage of white, 
U.S. Born, 40-50 years, expressed in 1990 U.S. $. 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
In Parenthesis Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors.   43
 
Table 10 

































































State Fixed Effects  No  No Yes Yes No No 
R
2  0.35  0.36 0.73  0.73  0.14 0.18 
Observations  160  160 160  160  144 144 
First Stage Estimation 



















































2  0.55  0.54 0.55  0.54  0.36 0.30 
 
Dependent Variable: Change between 1970 and 1990 in ln average monthly rent paid by  
white, U.S. Born, expressed in 1990 U.S. $. 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
In Parenthesis Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors.   44
Table 11 










































































2  0.36  0.35 0.35  0.24 0.34  0.22 
Observations  160  160 160  160 145  145 













2  n.a. n.a.  0.34 0.37  0.15 0.31 
 
Dependent Variable: Change between 1970 and 1990 in ln average yearly wage of white, 
U.S. Born, 40-50 years, expressed in 1990 U.S. $. 
Instrumental Variable: Imputed change in diversity index and share of foreign born, using 
the shift-share method. 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
In Parenthesis Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors.   45
Table 12 







































































2  0.38  0.37 0.33 0.36  0.28 0.28 














2  n.a.  n.a.  0.34 0.37  0.15 0.31 
 
Dependent Variable: Change between 1970 and 1990 in ln average yearly wage of white, 
U.S. Born, 40-50 years, expressed in 1990 U.S. $. 
Instrumental Variable: Imputed change in diversity index and share of foreign born, using 
the shift-share method. 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
In Parenthesis Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors.   46
 
 
Figure 1 - Wages and Diversity 
 
 
































































































































































































Figure 2 - Rents and Diversity 
 



































































































































































































Figure 3 – The Spatial Equilibrium 
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